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Implications and Consequences of Post-Modern Philosophy 
for Contemporary Transpersonal Studies 
II. Georges Bataille’s Post-Nietzschean Secular Mysticism, 
Phenomenology of Ecstatic States, 




The writings of the French philosopher Georges Bataille (1897-1962) offer their own 
contribution to the descriptive phenomenology of mystical and numinous states, as well as 
a version of the modern secular or this-worldly mysticism variously anticipated by Jung and 
Nietzsche, and a highly original sociology and social psychology of transpersonal experience, 
influenced by Max Weber, that helps to open an area not widely developed in recent studies. 
At the same time, the trauma and personal difficulties in Bataille’s life serve as a stark 
example of the often distortive effects of spiritual metapathologies on inner development. 
Bataille’s views of ecstatic states as entirely an immanent human capacity, in which he was 
greatly influenced by Nietzsche, offer an opportunity to address larger issues of the “truth 
value” of mystical states in contemporary transpersonal studies.
In ernational Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 32(2), 2013, pp. 79-97
The philosopher Georges Bataille (1897-1962) was a highly original, yet controversial precursor of contemporary transpersonal psychology, both 
in terms of his original phenomenology and comparative 
sociology of numinous experience, and in the persisting 
ambiguity over what larger “truth value” to find in his 
post-Nietzschean this-worldly mysticism as a naturalistic 
human capacity.
 Bataille’s understanding of the nature of ecstatic 
experience also duplicates, over a ten year span in his own 
development, a larger transition in 20th century “new age” 
spirituality.  The latter began with earlier advocacies of the 
re-enchantment of an archaic mythic and ritual religiosity, 
of the kind so intriguing at least initially to figures such 
as the early Jung and Eliade (Hakl, 2013), and sometimes 
appealing to a more right wing conservatism overlapping with 
the Fascistic movements of the 1930s.  Yet it ended with the 
more liberal and individualistic focus on psychedelic drug 
experience, visionary shamanism, and Eastern meditation 
of the 1960s (Ellwood, 1999; Hakl, 2013).  Bataille himself 
went from his own founding of a secret ritual society in 
the 1930s, based on his anthropological understanding 
of tribal festival practices of Dionysian group sexuality, 
animal sacrifice, and a fortunately unconsummated plan 
for an elective human sacrifice, to a dramatic shift in 1940s 
occupied France, where the collectivistic violence of Nazi 
mythology had become obvious, to his development in 
his major work Inner Experience (1954/1988) of an often 
surreal and highly dramatized version of an individual 
phenomenology of transformative ecstatic states.  It was this 
more individualized approach that he developed further in 
Erotism (1957/1986) and the three volumes of The Accursed 
Share (1967/1991, 1976/1993) into a sociology and social 
psychology of what he saw as the creative secular “mystic” 
of the future, potentially re-enchanting a secularized 
and nihilistic modernity in a manner close to the earlier 
concerns of the sociologist Max Weber (1922/1963) and 
the later Jung (1959).
Keywords: numinous ecstasy, personal sovereignty, inner-worldly mysticism, 
Being experience, Heidegger, self-referential incompleteness, Lakoff and Johnson 
on metaphor, libidinal excess, projective identification, charisma, unus mundus
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 Certainly the earlier Bataille is a cautionary tale, 
and he lived his entire life in states of considerable inner 
anguish and torment. This will be considered below, 
both in terms of current transpersonal psychologies of 
the “metapathologies” that can both drive and distort 
spiritual experience, and in terms of the rather horrific 
childhood which he never overcame, despite the 
therapeutic help that allowed him to externalize some of 
his suffering in initially anonymous pornographic novels 
of considerable imagistic bizarreness. His childhood 
was spent in helping with the home care of his slowly 
dying father, who suffered the blindness, physical pain 
and growing dementia of tertiary syphilis. Bataille 
initially sought to overcome his deep guilt over he and 
his mother abandoning the invalid father during their 
evacuation from Rheims in World War I, through 
seminary training for the priesthood.  However, he soon 
replaced any orthodox Catholicism with an orgiastic 
sado-masochistic sexuality that even his more “libertine” 
and surrealist circle regarded as “debauched,” and which 
he only partially “sublimated” into his initial attempt at 
a mythically elaborated cult (Suriya, 2002). 
 Despite a personal life of continuing instabilities, 
Bataille, in addition to his original phenomenology 
of mysticism, succeeded in formulating these more 
collective aspects of numinous states into an original 
sociology based on his own version of what W.R. 
Bion (1962) and other depth-psychoanalysts (Searles, 
1979) would later term “projective identification.” This 
he understood not as a means of defending against 
psychotic-like anxieties, but as a natural way that the 
inner dimensions of an individual capacity for essential 
or numinous experience are exteriorized onto personally 
“inspiring” mythic, heroic, or spiritual figures in society 
at large.  Such exteriorizations can then allow a partial 
and reflected re-incorporation of that capacity as one’s 
own sense of an ecstatic “sovereignty” or Being—a 
sociological version of Maslow (1962) and Almaas (1988) 
on experiencing one’s own identity as Being itself.
 In developing these themes in what follows 
it will also appear that Bataille’s work touches on a 
continuing ambiguity in contemporary transpersonal 
studies over whether a “secular” mysticism can be fully 
developed without some more transcendent attribution, 
and whether a larger “truth value” of such experience 
can be articulated on broadly naturalistic grounds 
alone, without risking the incipient nihilism with which 
Bataille himself continued to struggle.
Bataille’s Secular Mysticism
In his major work, Inner Experience, Bataille (1954/1988) sought to evoke and dramatize immediate 
moment by moment consciousness, as understood by 
Husserl and the early Heidegger, as intrinsically open to 
the ecstatic experience of Being, which, with the early 
Heidegger, he sees as the core of the “numinous” sense 
of wonder, awe, and bliss that would be the experiential 
basis of all religion (as also for Otto, 1917/1958). 
Here something like classical “mystical experience” is 
understood as latent within ordinary consciousness, 
coming forward into full awareness to the extent that 
our specifically human capacity for self awareness can 
suspend all pragmatic “projects” and concentrate only 
on its moment by moment flow.  In this regard, Bataille’s 
“inner experience” could be said to exemplify a secular 
or this-worldly understanding of “ecstasy” as a natural 
or inherent human capacity in the sense not only of 
Nietzsche, his major influence, but also of James, Jung, 
Maslow, and much of the later transpersonal psychology 
of “higher states of consciousness.”
 Bataille’s definition of ecstasy is unusually 
broad. In addition to the great mystics, whom he 
insists organized religion has falsely tamed with its 
fixed concepts, ecstasy includes paroxysmal laughter, 
eroticism, most specifically in its “transgressive” aspects, 
all spontaneous intoxications of enthusiasm, festival 
celebrations, and revolutionary violence, and the 
aesthetics of dance, music, tragedy, and poetry.  These 
are all “effusions” that express “a keen sensitivity to the 
present moment .... at the expense of every ... subsequent 
possibility” (Bataille, 1976/1993, pp. 229-230).
 This very breadth of definition has for 
some commentators (Libertson, 1995) called into 
question Bataille’s own use of the term “mystical.” 
While Bataille seeks to separate that usage from all 
confessional associations, he also terms it “man’s only 
pure experience” (Bataille, 1957/1986, p. 238).  Indeed, 
the broadly “this worldly” or “aesthetic” expressions 
he has in mind do fit with Max Weber’s (1922/1963) 
category of the “inner-worldly” mysticisms.  These are 
best exemplified in Sufism and Taoism, as well as in 
the Romanticism of Blake, Emerson, and Nietzsche 
himself, and can be contrasted with the more “other 
worldly” mysticisms of the East, medieval Catholicism, 
and Plotinus, as well as with the this- and other- worldly 
propheticisms of Judaism, Islam, and the Protestant 
Reformation (see also Hunt, 2003). Very generally, the 
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this-worldly mysticisms are centered on a capacity for 
numinous experience understood as “immanent.” Its 
“transcendent” expression is not to be found only or even 
principally in a higher or supra-sensible realm but in the 
contradictory multiplicities of everyday “becoming”—
the “thousand and one things” which form the outward 
emanations and fullest possible expression of a felt source 
or origin.  If one then adds that this immanent sense of 
source can also be understood as a naturalistic human 
capacity or intuitive intelligence, and as such, “outside 
the pale of specific religions” (Bataille, 1957/1986, p. 
34), then we arrive at a category of “secular mysticism,” 
as the “new age” variation of Weber’s original category 
within a secularized material society. It is this version of 
a this-worldly mysticism that Nietzsche, Bataille, and 
aspects of contemporary transpersonal psychology can 
be understood as articulating.
 The further questions of whether such a 
“humanistic” spirituality is fully realizable, and in 
what sense it risks its own form, intended or not, of the 
“nihilism” with which Bataille himself wrestled, will be 
considered below.
Synonyms for Ecstasy 
and the Necessity of a New “Negative Theology”
Inner Experience as Being
 Bataille offers multiple synonyms for “ecstasy,” 
in his own way extending a phenomenology of numinous 
experience also reflected in the multiple transpersonal 
dimensions of Otto (1917/1958), Laski (1961), and 
Almaas (1986). Most central for Bataille is the sense 
that these are experiences of Being, understood not as 
concept but as an immediate felt sense made possible by 
a specially intensified self awareness.  Being for Bataille is 
the experience of the inner form of the dawning of each 
moment of consciousness, “continuously slipping away” 
into an unrepresentable “nothingness”, such that while 
its dawning is sensed as an inner feeling of creation, its 
slipping away foreshadows a kind of “death”—a “wave of 
life losing itself” (Bataille, 1954/1988, p. 118; 1976/1993, 
p. 203).  
 Here Bataille shows an astonishing similarity 
to the then unpublished early lectures of Heidegger, 
as well as to his later manuscripts of the late 1930s. 
Heidegger, influenced by Schleiermacher (see Hunt, 
2012a), had initially understood mystical experience as 
the “intensifying concentration” or “reflectance” of our 
“self-aware existence” on the form of the “carry forward” 
of the arising moment into “horizonal openness”—a self 
aware “efflugence” of life itself (Heidegger, 1919/2008; 
1919/2013). The later Heidegger (1938/1994; 1942/2013) 
spoke in a way reminiscent of Rudolf Otto of Being as the 
numinous sense of “wonder,” “awe,” and “astonishment” 
that arises through sensing the very form of the unfolding 
“event,” experienced as an emerging gift “flowing forth” 
out of an unrepresentable “inceptionality.” That this 
openness is also for Heidegger a “downgoing” and for 
Bataille a “slipping away” led both to their preoccupation 
with a felt affirmation of “nothingness” and “death” as 
always implicit in numinous ecstatic states.1
 Both Bataille and Heidegger independently 
echoed William James (1912/1971; 1911/1996) on this 
potential for “pure experience” as a background sense, 
beneath the multiple, more specific “whatnesses” of 
our experience, of an encompassing “thatness” of the 
unfolding moment which resists or negates any fixed 
formulation—and would be the core of mystical states. 
This author has previously suggested that such experience 
is based on the inner or abstract form of the organismic 
“orientation response” to the very sense of an unknown 
novelty ahead—here as the numinous sense of a “wholly 
other” (Hunt, 1995).
Inner Experience as Intimacy
 Ecstatic states entail a “pure intimacy” (Bataille, 
1967/1991), such that the “discontinuities” of personal 
identity are replaced by a unique “continuity” in which 
barriers between self and other are eliminated (Bataille, 
1957/1986). Here alone is true “communication” 
possible.  This can be most striking, of course, in shared 
laughter and intense eroticism.  But it is Bataille’s insight 
that we are most connected to others in the most intense 
states of religious and mystical consciousness, which we 
have instead tended to understand as our most private 
and inward moments, and so missing their evocative or 
“charismatic” effects with and on others.  In this regard 
he was most directly influenced by the sociologist Emile 
Durkheim (1912/1995) on a “collective consciousness” 
best reflected in the shared “effervescence” of ritual and 
religious symbolization. Bataille (1967/1991) says that 
the sacred “things” of communal spiritual belief and 
celebration “make visible on the outside that which is 
really within” (p. 189), albeit with the continuous risk of 
a secularization that substitutes the merely “outward” for 
what was the intended “pure intimacy” of their earlier 
evocations.  While the present author has attempted to 
expand elsewhere on this notion of human consciousness 
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as intrinsically shared and collective (Hunt, 1995, 2010, 
2011, 2012b), it remains the case, as will be pursued 
below, that it was Bataillle who developed the first fully 
original transpersonal sociology.
Inner Experience as Sovereignty
 The ecstatic experience of Being is also what 
Bataille (1967/1991) terms a “sovereign moment.”  This 
is the experience of an inherent or existential sovereignty 
allowed by the pure “self consciousness” of mystical 
ecstasy—“the return of Being to full and irreducible 
sovereignty” as a “freedom” within the timelessness of 
the unfolding moment (p. 189).  Bataille’s “sovereignty” 
of the person is very close to what Almaas (1988) has 
termed “essential identity” or the “point”—in which 
there is both an expansion and focus of one’s sense of 
identity as Being itself.  For Bataille this felt sense would 
have been most available in the vision quests of hunter-
gatherer shamanism, but it would undergo a progressive 
displacement and projection caused by the endless tasks 
and “servilities” demanded by more complex economies. 
Projected forward and away from an immediate 
ecstatic experience, it becomes the future supra-sensible 
immortality or after-life that Nietzsche (1888/1954) so 
forcefully rejected in Pauline Christianity, and Bataille 
sees as a merely “pretended” deferment of the sovereignty 
experience.
Bataille’s “Atheology”
 Meister Eckhart, often cited by Bataille in Inner 
Experience (1954/1988), says in one of his sermons:
The eye by which I see God is the same as the eye 
by which God sees me. My eye and God’s eye are 
one and the same...therefore whatever you get, you 
get from yourself....God and I: we are one. (Eckhart, 
fourteenth century/1941, pp. 82, 206, 244)
Taking this exclusively on the side of human experience, 
we could say that Bataille, with Nietzsche, is interested 
only in the epistemology of mystical experience as an 
inner intuitive capacity, rather than in any ontology 
of a God seeing us. Bataille goes much further than 
Otto, James, or Jung in seeking to separate a felt core 
of mystical experience from any traditional religious 
schematization.  God as concept and belief falsifies the 
“inconceivable unknown” revealed in ecstasy.  It “makes 
us feel there was a subjectivity that necessarily carried 
more weight than our own” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 
417).  Describing himself as “atheist” and “unbeliever,” 
he rejects all “positive theology” that ends by having 
“inserted God into the chain of ends and means” that 
lead to some “after-life” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 316).
 Only the “vehemence” of a “negative theology,” 
based on the intuition of a nondiscursive sense of Being, 
can overcome the “endless servility” of “all traditional 
dogma and belief.” Yet this will leave a very thin line 
between Bataille’s version of a naturalistic transpersonal 
spirituality and a kind of nihilism—and this he terms 
his “atheology.”
Being is “ungraspable.” It is only “grasped” in 
error; the error is not just easy ... it is the condition 
of thought. God is nothingness. Being is nowhere. 
(Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 317)
  
 The meditative or spontaneous experience of 
an open emptiness welling forth from “nothingness,” so 
basic to Eckhart, Ibn Arabi, and the later Heidegger, has 
traditionally appeared only at the most subtle and slowly 
developed stages of traditional spiritual practice, whereas, 
as will be outlined below, Bataille’s own experiences and 
predominant understanding of ecstasy remained with its 
more specifically intense and so more preliminary forms. 
Perhaps accordingly, in his radical heterodoxy Bataille 
often seems to pass over into a kind of Gnostic nihilism 
and/or existential despair that has traditionally been 
seen as the vulnerability or risk of a “negative theology” 
(Altizer, 2003; Hunt, 2003, 2007).  Indeed, it can become 
difficult to separate a capacity to attune to the impalpable 
unfolding moment as a timeless ecstasy from a sort of self 
fulfilling cognitive illusion. Meanwhile, if Nietzsche’s 
“death of God” releases the life-affirming ecstasy of 
traditional spirituality as now entirely our own, it can 
be difficult to see how that will have any “truth value” 
beyond the merely pragmatic one Bataille scorned.
 As will be addressed later, part of the 
importance of Bataille today may be in his extreme 
and pointed articulation of these genuine ambiguities 
that remain largely implicit within a “human sciences” 
transpersonalism or a contemporary “science of 
consciousness.”
Bataille’s Existential Philosophy 
of Human Nature
The key characteristic of human consciousness for Bataille in Inner Experience is its intrinsic 
“excess,” and a conjoined “anguish,” both as the result 
of an imaginative symbolic capacity simultaneously 
compelling us toward a “totality of the possible” which 
we must also sense as impossible to attain.  This “wish 
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to be everything” can be temporarily fulfilled in ecstatic 
states, but is always opposed to the contending and 
contradictory multiplicities of all practical “projects”—
that “impossible combination of movements that destroy 
one another” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 342). Human 
experience is an “infinite turbulence...a headlong rush 
forward...that loses any possibility of coming to a halt” 
(Bataille, 1945/1992, pp. 182-184). In this sense Bataille 
is advancing a theory of intrinsic human unbalance.
 As a philosopher Bataille is best regarded as 
transitional, linking a traditional metaphysics, that 
would indeed posit such a single encompassing essence 
of human nature, and a post-modern relativism that 
would reject any single “totalizing account.”  On the 
one hand, for Bataille, there is “excess” as the essence 
of human nature – explicitly patterned on the “will to 
power” of Nietzsche, who Heidegger regarded as the last 
great metaphysician of Western thought.  While on the 
other hand, that very excess results from the intrinsic 
openness of our endlessly self referential consciousness 
which must remain incomplete and partial. On this post-
modern side of Bataille, our continuous “falling short” is 
attested by the saving capacity for shared laughter.
 The later Heidegger (1944/2011) suggested two 
levels of discourse in major philosophers. First, there 
is the philosopher’s “main thought,” which approaches 
a would-be metaphysics to the extent that it posits a 
“main trait” for all beings—a single all-encompassing 
“whatness” of things.  Second, there is the philosopher’s 
“fundamental” or “ground” thought, most often implicit 
or even occluded, which for Heidegger is a “poetized,” 
necessarily metaphoric evocation of Being—which 
with its felt sense of awe, wonder, and mystery is the 
experiential origin of Otto’s sense of the numinous 
(Heidegger, 1938/1994).
 For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s (1888/1967) 
“fundamental” thought is his “eternal recurrence of 
the same,” which he described as his own personally 
terrifying nihilistic challenge for yea-saying or ecstatic 
affirmation by his creative “overman” of the future. 
Bataille independently agreed with Heidegger here, 
understanding “eternal recurrence” not as a literally 
intended concept or theory, but as a spontaneous ecstatic 
evocation and original schematization of the felt eternity 
and timelessness of the numinous:
I imagine that Nietzsche had the experience of the 
eternal return in a form which is properly mystical, 
confused with discursive representation....The object 
of his vision—what made him laugh and tremble— 
was not the return (and not even time), but what the 
return laid bare, the impossible depth of things. ... 
Perceiving it there is nothing left to do but ... lose 
oneself in ecstasy, weep (Bataille, 1954/1988, pp. 27, 
154)
It is important to note that Bataille’s version of Nietzsche 
here is not that of the more analytic post-war attempts of 
Kaufmann (1956) or Foucault (1977) to redeem Nietzsche 
from unfair accusations of an influence on Fascism, 
but the more personal Nietzsche of the Dionysian yea-
saying – which did lead to multiple mythically inspired 
“Nietzsche cults” earlier in the 20th century (Noll, 1994), 
including that of Bataille.
 Meanwhile, Nietzsche’s “main thought” and 
what makes him the “last metaphysician” for Heidegger, 
and this despite his major influence on the relativism and 
perspectivalism of “post-modern” thought, is the “will 
to power”—as the essence of not only humanity and 
life, but, in the late notebooks of the physical universe 
itself (Nietzsche, 1988/1967).  Bataille’s version, and the 
source of his own intellectual inspiration, is his doctrine 
of “excess.” For Bataille this “excess” is not only the 
essence of human consciousness but of all life.  As with 
Nietzsche, his key metaphor for this intrinsic excess 
comes from the physical universe, in particular in the 
unstinting and unreturned energy pouring forth from 
the sun:
The origin and essence of our wealth are given in 
the radiation of the sun, which dispenses energy 
—wealth—without any return. The sun gives 
without ever receiving. ... Living matter receives and 
accumulates it...then radiates and squanders it. ... Its 
extreme exuberance pours out in a movement always 
bordering on explosion. (Bataille, 1967/1991, pp. 28, 
29, 30)
In human life this potential excess presents a fundamental 
problem.  Where it cannot be used and fully absorbed 
within the systems of society, and so must exceed those 
limits, “it must be spent ... willingly or not, gloriously or 
catastrophically” (Bataille, 1967/1991, p. 21).
 In human economies there is always some 
portion of this excess energy to be released.  This is his 
concept of the “accursed share.” The least destructive 
social patterning of this necessary “wastage” Bataille 
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locates in the Potlach tradition of hunter-gatherer 
peoples, with its continuous competition in reciprocal 
gift giving. Bataille’s intuition of the importance of 
this gift-giving mandate as the fundamental means 
of forestalling the corrosive effects of envy and social 
hierarchy seems well attested by more recent work on 
the sheer extremity of class distinctions in later primitive 
kingships (Trigger, 2003; Bellah, 2011).  For Bataille 
the earlier balancing of Potlach traditions was lost in 
more complex economies, with their “catastrophic” 
expenditures in the form of widespread warfare, the 
huge monuments of classical civilizations, and the “ritual 
wastage” of human sacrifice.  The organized religions of 
primitive kingships became the ultimate justification 
that these more complex societies gave to this necessary 
“squandering,” as also reflected in the suspensions of 
ordinary sexual and aggressive prohibitions in ritual 
festivals. While on the societal level the most complete 
balancing of this excess was already achieved in Potlach, 
on the individual level its most pure expression is to be 
found in mystical experience.
Bataille’s “Excess” 
and Related Theories of Human Unbalance  
Certainly from the perspective of a post-modern relativism in which we are necessarily always 
within any human nature we might seek to comprehend 
objectively, there can be no proof of Bataille’s view of 
a human essence of excess and unbalance. And this 
must follow despite the deep intuitive unease about the 
ultimate balance of the species shared by world religions 
and mythologies.  Yet there can equally be no disproof 
either, and Bataille is in some very good company with 
his own version of some major theories of a human 
nature.
Freud and Jung on “Excessive Libido”
 Both Freud (1917/1957) and Jung (1948/1960) 
posited an “excessive libido” or “instinctual drivenness 
“as following from our uniquely self-stimulating 
imaginative capacity. Freud’s Id and Jung’s shadow 
are not merely our inner “animalistic” selves, but a 
heightened, perversely driven sexuality and aggression, 
whose fantasy amalgams are unique to human beings. 
For Jung this makes any core of our instinctual drives 
unknowable, with their most direct experience as the 
energy or “mana” of the numinous.  While for Freud too, 
the instincts are only knowable through their fantasy 
elaborations, whose repressive containment causes them 
to “ramify like a fungus” in an “uncanny” drivenness 
(Freud, 1915/1959).  In Bataille’s terms this means that 
human sexuality and aggression have an inherent inner 
tendency that is automatically “transgressive,” which 
is also his characterization of the full range of ecstatic 
states—as always displacing an everyday profane order. 
The social suppression of this imaginative drivenness 
has traditionally been compensated by the energized 
“sovereign transgressions” seen in mysticism, archaic 
festivals, and for Bataille himself in the elaborated sado-
masochism of De Sade and his own anonymous novels.
The Incompleteness of Self Reference 
and Bataille’s “Blindspot”
 Another explanation of the human striving 
toward incompletable “totality” comes from the intrinsic 
openness of our cognitive-symbolic self reference, which 
we must attempt to fill with an endless, self transforming 
creativity. Modern formulations here range from Mead’s 
(1934) sense of an unknowable “I” at the core of all 
experience, to Ricoeur (1984) on the unfillable blackhole-
like aporias of self, other, consciousness, and time 
created by our open self reference, and Godel’s theorum 
of the intrinsic inconsistency/incompleteness of any self 
referring formal system (Bronowski, 1971).  
 Bataille’s version here is to posit the source of 
our endlessly partial “projects” of mind and society 
as necessarily incomplete attempts to fill an intrinsic 
cognitive “blindspot”—analogous to the blindspot of 
the eye except that it pushes forward into all attempts at 
self understanding:
The [blindspot] absorbs one’s attention: it is no 
longer the spot which loses itself in knowledge, but 
knowledge which loses itself in it. ... Existence in 
the end discloses the blindspot of understanding 
and right away becomes completely absorbed in it 
... What alone remains is circular agitation—which 
does not exhaust itself in ecstasy and begins again 
from it. (Bataille, 1954/1988, pp. 110-111)
The concept of God is the cognitive resultant of 
the automatic attempt to fill this sense of open 
incompleteness, while experientially only spontaneous 
ecstasy can approach the felt sense of a “nondiscursive” 
peace and temporary completeness that is not a “means” 
to anything other than itself.  What temporary balance 
for us is possible comes from transpersonal experience.
Incommensurabilities of Person and Thing
 Bataille also presents his own version of a theory 
of human unbalance that the present author (Hunt, 2009) 
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has also sought to develop in terms of the human symbolic 
capacity as the creative driving together of two ultimately 
incommensurate domains of cognitive intelligence—
“person knowing,” based on our capacity for empathy, 
and “thing knowing,” as the manipulative intelligence of 
tools and technology. It has been suggested that these were 
preliminary but largely separate in the higher apes and early 
hominids (Mithen, 1998), and that it is their intertwining 
that defines the human symbolic capacity (Mithen, 1998; 
Hunt, 2009).  At their respective extremes, weighted first 
on the side of thing intelligence, there is our capacity to 
transform all things in nature, as well as people themselves, 
in terms of human purposes.  Everything becomes tool or 
commodity.  While this same creative fusion weighted on 
the side of person knowing is reflected in the necessity, 
developed independently by Jung (1944/1953), Asch 
(1961), and most recently Lakoff and Johnson (1999), of 
an anthropomorphically embodied physical metaphor 
for the representation and full embodiment of our more 
complex emotional experiences—including the loving 
light of classical mystical experience (Hunt, 2006, 2009).
 Yet persons are not things and things not 
persons, so that their intertwining can never achieve 
any final balanced synthesis. Indeed, certain of these 
domain amalgams are especially unstable, and so become 
the chronic sources of human excess, as specifically 
reflected in slavery, torture, and warfare, where persons 
are treated as objects of extreme physical manipulation, 
or in the extremes of sorcery and magic where things are 
given personal agency.  Bataille focuses especially on the 
tendency to treat the sovereign person as a commodity, 
which he considers as the “primary alienation” of 
humanity, prior even to the appearance of overt slavery or 
human sacrifice.  It is the danger already implicit in tool 
use by a self-symbolizing creature. “Man, who makes use 
of the tool, becomes a tool himself, he becomes himself an 
object just as the tool is an object” (Bataille, 1976/1993, 
p. 213). Complex economic development further degrades 
our potential for a sovereignty of Being, in terms of our 
becoming more and more complex “things of servile 
use.” Indeed, if Bataille (1976/1993), foreshadowing 
Foucault (1983), is correct, this unbalance becomes both 
augmented and more subtlety pervasive in the elaborate 
bureaucratization of institutional power and regulation 
in modern capitalist economies, where persons are valued 
only in terms of a quantitatively measureable utility.
 Whereas the later Heidegger (1949/2012) saw 
this commodification as the unique dilemma of modern 
technology, Bataille understood it as already present at our 
human beginnings, in the face of which archaic humanity 
sought:
to define alongside the world of practice, that is, the 
profane world, a sacred world; alongside the man 
more or less constrained to serve, a sovereign man; 
alongside profane time, a sacred time. (Bataille, 
1976/1993, p. 214)
Religion in general answered the desire to find himself, 
to regain an intimacy that was always strangely lost. 
(Bataille, 1967/1991, p. 129)
Yet the danger of religion was always of becoming its own 
commodity, itself sanctioning more and more elaborate 
forms of tool-like servility—which for Nietzsche became 
his major critique of later Christianity. For Bataille, the 
dilemma of Western modernity had become how to 
liberate our person capacity for the conjoined qualities of 
ecstasy as Being, sovereignty, and authentic intimacy, from 
the dehumanizing “utilities” of a social order quantified in 
terms of things.
Bataille on the History and Future of Religion
 In his final work, the three-volume The Accursed 
Share, Bataille (1967/1991; 1976/1993) addresses this 
struggle between spirituality and the commodification 
of the person by a further development of Max Weber 
(1904/1958) on the Protestant ethic as the “inner spirit” 
supporting early capitalism. For Bataille Protestant 
Calvinism attempted for the middle classes what Marx 
would later envision for a broader proletariat: to re-
confer an individual sovereignty of Being through 
newly sanctified motives for an increasing economic 
productivity—motives ultimately doomed to ever 
more secularization. In Calvinism the accumulation of 
personal wealth became the outer sign of God’s grace, 
but with the inevitable effect of “living less and less in 
the present” (Bataille, 1967/1991, p. 133), and more and 
more oriented toward a future sovereignty postponed into 
a heavenly after-life. Meanwhile, Marxist communism 
mandated an intensified economic productivity and rapid 
industrialization in order to someday allow a new utopian 
form of shared Being-ness. Marxism sought to finally 
attain, with Bataille here quoting the early Marx, the 
sense of “not being merely like a thing, but of being in a 
sovereign manner” (Bataille, 1967/1991, p. 135)—which 
had previously been conferred by an illusory God. In 
both Protestantism and Marxism an intrinsic individual 
autonomy of Being was inevitably lost to a permanently 
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projected and receding future—heavenly or earthly. 
Both traditions for Bataille reflected a maximum point 
of tension between a sacred presence and profane utility, 
destined by the ever more complex servilities of modern 
economic life to tilt permanently toward the latter.2
 Bataille also developed his own version of Ernst 
Troeltsch’s (1931/1992) prediction of a future this-
worldly, secular mysticism, as the “secret religion” of the 
educated middle classes—a “new age” spirituality in the 
face of the radical secularization of a more traditionally 
ethical-prophetic Judeo-Christian orientation (see also 
Hunt, 2003).  For Bataille such a potential shift toward 
Weber’s inner-worldly mysticism would rest on a potential 
“widespread upward adjustment of living standards,” in 
which the sheer excesses of modern capitalism would 
ultimately generate a version of the post-war Marshall Plan 
for all peoples.  Such a prosperity and expanded conditions 
for leisure would create the outward conditions for a 
renewed individual sovereignty more typical of traditional 
shamanic peoples, and would encourage a widespread 
“interiority” and openness to ecstasy. For Weber 
(1922/1963) any widespread development of a pervasive 
this-worldly mysticism would indeed require the degree 
of individual freedom and material security that Bataille, 
writing in the late 1950s, was anticipating.  Bataille hoped 
for an expanded equality of living standards, which was 
indeed the initial promise of a post-war capitalism and 
its potential globalization, such that a re-newed sense 
of sovereign Being would allow “an ahistorical mode of 
existence” or an “end of history” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 
190), and a post-Nietzschian “cultivation of individual 
excess.”  Interestingly, with both the later Heidegger and 
some contemporary transpersonalists, Bataille held that 
his re-newed sovereign humanity would be both a return 
to a shamanic “first beginning” before the “invention” 
of God, and a “second beginning” for a more originary 
ecstatic capacity understood as an essential part of new 
expanded humanism. Something like this was also 
envisioned by early psychedelic drug researchers such as 
Leary (1968) and Grof (1972).3
Some Further Insights, Limitations, 
and Selective Metapathologies 
of Bataille on Ecstasy
“Intensity,” “Anguish,” 
and the Rejection of Technique
 Although Bataille clearly shows a conceptual 
interest in the more subtle formless states of the developed 
Christian and Eastern mystics, his predominant language 
for the spontaneous ecstasies he advocates, and his own 
experiences in Inner Experience, center on words such as 
“intensity,” “anguish,” “agitation,” “terror,” and “nausea.” 
In this way he keeps his focus on what Evelyn Underhill 
(1955) would regard as the preliminary or access levels 
of “purgation,” well short of more unitive states. His 
emphasis on a dimension of increasing intensity is also 
reflected in his inclusion of paroxsymal laughter and erotic 
transgression in his phenomenology of ecstasy.  Initially at 
least, he saw the formless states of Eastern meditation as a 
kind of “religious torpor” (Bataille, 1954/1988, p. 183).
 With this concentration on “intensity” goes a 
related exclusive valuing of “spontaneity” and rejection 
of all “project,” “ascesis” or technique.  Thus for Bataille 
both traditional systems of spiritual understanding and 
their meditative techniques of sustained practice have the 
unintended consequence of making ecstatic states into 
a self-fulfilling project—an intended “thing.”  This also 
means that he rejects all drug use, without any apparent 
realization of the more open-ended, less pre-programmed 
properties of much psychedelic drug research (Grof, 1972). 
The key seems to be that deliberate induction would 
threaten spontaneity and freedom.  Yet it is hard to see 
how Bataille could then approach the more subtle stages 
of unitive experience, with their admittedly paradoxical 
dedication to “project” in techniques of deep meditation. 
He also misses the varying degree of consensus among 
Otto (1917/1958), Max Scheler (1923/1960), and Martin 
Buber (1957) that the fuller forms of mystical experience 
are always an emergent dialectic between spontaneous 
numinous feeling and its schematization in terms of 
cultural understanding—each leading and further 
articulating the other (see also Hunt, 2012a).  
Proust as This-Worldly Mystic of Presence
 Whatever the limitations of Bataille’s 
concentration on the more preliminary or access levels 
of ecstasy, it seems also to have sensitized him to forms 
of an emerging this-worldly mysticism generally not 
recognized as such. In particular there is Bataille’s 
(1954/1988) analysis of Proust’s spontaneous experiences 
of re-lived remembrance as an ecstatic state.  For Proust 
(1927) the seemingly necessary separation of the sense 
of semantic meaning conferred by imaginative memory 
from immediate here and now perception means that 
the latter lacks the sense of heightened significance that 
follows from its later assimilation in memory.  In turn 
memory lacks the felt reality and impact of immediate 
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existence. Proust discovered a spontaneous experiential 
“doubling over” of the felt meaning of specific memory 
and the immediacy of perceived event as the basis for his 
The Past Recaptured. There he describes a sudden fullness of 
remembrances re-lived in the here and now as a “timeless 
joy,” and a “fragment of time in its pure state,” in which 
“immediately the permanent essence of things, usually 
concealed, is set free”—such that “liberated from the 
order of time...the word ‘death’ could have no meaning” 
(Proust, 1927, pp. 996, 1000).  
 Bataille identifies this as the same experience of 
presence or Being central to mystical/ecstatic experience. 
It would appear to be a version in states of remembrance 
of the same enhancement of timeless presence described 
in meditation. In more contemporary transpersonal 
terms, Proust is describing a version of Maslow on “peak 
experience” or Gurdjieff on the felt expansions of “self-
remembering” in here and now situations, but for Proust 
located in the full reliving of a significant past situation, 
thus completing the experiential self awareness of its fully 
felt presence lacking on the original occasion.4
 For purposes of more recent comparison, 
Proust was locating a potential transformation in lived 
remembrance very similar to the transformation of 
ordinary dream experience called lucid dreaming—the 
realization that one is actually dreaming while the dream 
continues.  Just as it is easy to miss the fact that Proust is 
speaking of much more than vivid memory, lucid dreaming 
is often wrongly seen as simply a cognitive awakening 
within the dream. Whereas the actual experience of 
dream lucidity, and reason for its widespread interest, 
can often include a sense of felt presence and bliss that 
make its phenomenology akin to “peak experience” and 
spontaneous “self remembering” (Hunt, 1989). Indeed 
the capacity for lucid dreaming is explicitly cultivated as a 
form of meditative realization in Buddhist and Vedantist 
mysticism – a linkage also supported by the shared 
phenomenological, cognitive, and neurophysiological 
correlates of lucid dreaming and deep meditation (Hunt, 
1989; Gackenbach & Bosveld, 1989; Gillespie, 1988). 
The commonalities between Proust’s felt states of presence 
in remembrance and the sense of Being in lucid dreams 
support both as spontaneous meditation-like states.
Spiritual Metapathologies 
in Bataille’s Life and Work
 Bataille has both his own understanding and his 
own vulnerability in terms of what Almaas (1988) and 
Maslow (1971) have called the spiritual metapathologies 
that can follow from disruptions of the ordinary 
sense of self in mystical states—including grandiosity, 
moral inversion, and/or emotional withdrawal. James 
(1902) called these “theopathies.”  Much in the hyper-
dramatization of Bataille’s writing and his personal life 
(see below) suggests such unbalancing effects, while he 
himself also warns against such risks. He points out 
that the very transgressive eroticism he advocates risks 
reducing the other to the status of a mere tool, deprived 
of the very sovereignty he values. He also suggests 
that Nietzsche’s “human sacrifice” of God risks the 
megalomania of oneself becoming God, and so an even 
greater solitude than that of more traditional mystics. 
Bataille’s earlier involvement in a sacrificial pagan cult 
certainly implies his own engulfment within what 
Grof (1972) saw as the blocked “peri-natal matrices” of 
violence, torture, and human sacrifice as preliminary to 
any fuller transpersonal realization.  The group members 
were fortunate indeed that no one was willing to be the 
actual executioner for the supposed sacrificial volunteer 
(Suriya, 2002). By the time of the writing of Inner 
Experience in the middle 1940s Bataille was able to say 
that the importance of images of sacrificial death “should 
not be understood in the literal sense...of really renewing 
the savage practice” (Bataille, 1954/1986, p. 196).
 He did not, however, distance himself from 
what can be seen as the metapathology of his own 
deliberate living out of the “moral evil” of a “transgressive 
eroticism,” based on the sado-masochism of De Sade 
reinterpreted as “mystical sovereignty.”  In the same spirit 
that James (1902) saw alcoholism as a distortive “poor 
man’s mysticism,” the psycho-analyst Masud R. Khan in 
his Alienation in Perversions (1979), also citing De Sade 
as example, discussed a pattern in some schizoid clients 
who, complaining of an absence of “feeling real” and as 
its attempted cure, seek self-transforming “epiphanies” 
or experiences of Being through risky sado-masochistic 
sexual adventuring with strangers and in group orgies. 
For Khan, this is based on the simultaneous attraction 
to, and fear of, oblivion and “death” that also fascinated 
Bataille.  Khan described a degree of planning and ritual 
pursuit in these clients that made their sexuality a kind 
of “private religion” centered on this quasi-mystical 
search for a way of fully feeling a sense of Being.
 The distortive element in both Bataille’s eroticism 
and in his understanding of traditional mysticism may 
also be reflected in his suggestion that the “apathy” De 
Sade advocated, as the emotional detachment needed for 
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the most extreme sado-masochistic practices, is the same 
as the “apathy” of the more subtle and formless mysticisms 
(Bataille, 1954/1988). At the same time, he warned 
that in any cultivating of the “ecstatic sovereignties” 
of transgressive eroticism it will be important to limit 
“possibly disastrous consequences” by an awareness of 
one’s own limitations and tolerance (Bataille, 1957/1986, 
p. 185). Bataille’s earlier life provides good reason for 
these cautions, as well as some understanding of the 
“irresistible excesses” with which he came to experiment.
The Personal Equation: 
Bataille’s Childhood as Trauma and Source
 Throughout Bataille’s childhood he, with 
his mother and sister, helped to care for his invalided 
slowly dying syphilitic father.  The father’s suffering was 
extreme. He was incontinent, staring in his blindness 
unblinkingly into the sun, often writhing and screaming 
in physical pain, and with hints of attempted sexual 
molestations prior to his increasing tertiary dementia 
(Suriya, 2002). Bataille seems to have felt a deep love 
for this horrifically suffering father, and so also an 
immense guilt after the family felt constrained to leave 
him behind in the forced evacuation from Rheims 
during World War I.  This happened when Bataille was 
seventeen, only to learn of his final death a year later. 
It becomes understandable how the young orthodoxly 
religious Bataille would identify his father’s suffering and 
sacrificial abandonment with the crucifixion of Jesus, and 
he later described his initial year of seminary training, 
prior to its abrupt abandonment, as an “attempted 
evasion” of his extreme guilt. This more traditional 
attempt at religious sublimation was then followed by 
an equally understandable and longer lasting conversion 
to Nietzsche, who had also died in tertiary syphilitic 
insanity, and the latter’s “beyond good and evil” of the 
sovereign “overman.”  During these initial years Bataille, 
in apparent deep identification with the father, pursued 
extremes of sado-masochistic sexuality in brothel orgies 
that even his “libertine” friends among French surrealist 
circles found “debauched.” He also experimented with 
Russian roulette (Suriya, 2002).
 Some degree of stabilization, and a lifelong 
gratitude, came through his psychoanalytic therapy with 
Adrien Borel, who, similarly to Otto Rank in Paris of 
the 1920s (Lieberman, 1985), specialized in the relatively 
unorthodox treatment of the highly creative.  Bataille later 
said “it changed me from being as absolutely obsessive as 
I was into someone relatively viable,” (Suriya, p. 99), and 
it helped to replace his inhibited silence with others with 
a rather forceful extraversion.  Borel encouraged him to 
partially exteriorize his sexual obsessions in a series of 
initially anonymous pornographic novels (he worked as 
a state librarian), beginning with The Story of the Eye and 
culminating in his best known Blue of Noon.  Much of 
the imagery of these novels was apparently derived from 
his father’s suffering, including notions of a pineal eye 
in all persons capable of staring directly into the sun, 
and of the sun itself as cosmic anus excreting light. 
Borel also gave him a series of pictures of a Chinese 
torture victim, with hair literally standing on end, 
undergoing the “death of a hundred pieces,” one cut per 
day followed by the photograph.  Bataille later described 
these photographs, with or without irony, as inspiring an 
ecstasy of love and compassion, rather than any of the 
sado-masochism with which we also know he continued 
to engage (Bataille, 1954/1968).  So perhaps there is in 
all this a kind of sublimation, eventually as its own kind 
of spirituality, which in his own anguish and guilt, a 
seminary training could not address.
 His secret society, Acéphale, had, apart from 
their initial ambitions for an actual human sacrifice, 
some similarity to other “Nietzsche cults” of the era 
(Noll, 1994). These, sometimes also inspired by the 
anarchism of Sorel (1919/1961), sought a re-enchantment 
of secularized society by means of the often violent 
imageries of pagan myth.  The actual membership and 
specific ritual and orgiastic activities of Bataille’s group 
have remained secret, but surprisingly enough at least 
its outer fringes included a young Jacques Lacan, later 
one of the major innovators of modern psychoanalysis. 
Some critics later saw a link with the similar use of myth 
and ritual in early German Fascism, and Bataille, like 
Jung at the same time (Ellwood, 1999), was certainly 
fascinated by the propaganda methods and ritual rallies 
of the National Socialists.  However, Bataille soon came 
to see Nazism, with its emphasis on the servitude and 
subordination of the individual, as a deep falsification 
of the personal freedom and ecstatic sovereignty sought 
by his own group.  By the mid 1940s his own “mystical” 
path had become entirely individual.
 That said, the personal impression he continued 
to make on others was complex and sometimes 
disconcerting. He is said to have had an especially 
portentous, somewhat unctuous manner of speech, 
described as having the “solemnity” of a prelate.  Some 
saw this, given his advocacy of sado-masochistic group 
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sex, as “diabolical,” as if he were an “evil priest,” while 
most who came to know him best saw this seriousness 
as covering an exalted, often childlike, spontaneity, 
and a tendency to be carried away by the emotions 
of the moment (Suriya, 2002). Certainly, however, 
his understanding of an ecstatic sexuality had less 
to do with any would-be Dionysian yea-saying, but 
rather reflected a more purgative inversion of values. 
He described his sexuality, which he associates with a 
deliberate immersion in “animal muck,” “putrification,” 
and “anticipation of death” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 119), 
as “this disgust that has become my delight” (p. 118). 
He terms this his “hypermorality,” based on a “sanctity 
of evil” that “reaches toward a pure sovereign intensity” 
(Suriya, 2002, pp. 431-432).  Again there is this form of 
spirituality that insists on purgation and anguish, and 
approaches a kind of Gnostic antinomian inversion of 
values (see Hunt, 2003). 
 Whatever his original insights into a 
contemporary this-worldly mysticism, Bataille’s version 
of a Nietzschean yea-saying remained caught within his 
own characterological issues, be they meta-pathological 
or more overtly clinical. In a late interview Bataille 
spoke of God’s “despair”: “a despair no human being 
could have the power to imagine,” such that “to be God 
is equivalent to torture” (Suriya, 2002, p. 483). The 
necessity of God’s continuous assent to the very worst 
of all that exists creates a despair that would justify God 
in committing suicide.  In this it is hard not to see the 
suffering of both himself and his father, and a life spent 
in its attempted spiritual redemption – some of that 
genuine, some severely distortive.
 It seems likely that without Borel there would 
have been instead only an early death.
An Original Sociology 
of Ecstatic Sovereignty
The most original element of Bataille on ecstasy, only fully developed in his final writings The 
Accursed Share and Erotism, comes with what he saw as 
the intrinsically social aspect of ecstatic states—their 
opening into the only genuine intimacy possible for 
human beings. With Durkheim (1912/1961), states of 
ecstatic Being are intrinsically a “collective consciousness” 
(see also Hunt, 2010, 2011). They are “a contagious 
subjectivity like an intimate tidal wave” communicated 
by “sensible emotional contact” (Bataille, 1976/1993, p. 
243).  With Weber on charisma, as the social face of Otto’s 
numinous, ecstatic states are for Bataille an intrinsic, if 
often nascent, human capacity most readily projected 
onto others—in religion onto God, later in more secular 
contexts onto the “sovereign” leaders of different forms 
of social order, and most recently onto the “stars” of mass 
media.  In Bataille’s secular spirituality of the future all 
these projections must be taken back and re-owned as the 
intrinsic existential right of each sovereign individual. 
Here Bataille quotes Nietzsche from his late notebooks:
“All the beauty and sublimely we have bestowed upon 
real and imaginary things, I will reclaim as the property 
and product of men.” To which Bataille adds: “We see 
our own deep subjectivity into these imaginary others 
... for which we have renounced the possibility of seeing 
the magnificence in ourselves. ... There was nothing 
in God or in the kings, that was not first in man.” 
(Bataille, 1976/1993, pp. 375-376, 321)
 With regard to acute psychotic states, considered 
here as the inversion of mystical experience (Hunt, 1995, 
2003, 2007), there is some evidence, supportive of Bataille 
on the social projection of the numinous, of how intense 
subjective states are not only readily projected onto 
others, but actually induced in them—a phenomenon in 
later object-relations psychoanalysis termed “projective 
identification” (Bion, 1962). Harold F. Searles (1979), 
in his long-term psychotherapy with both hospitalized 
schizophrenic and borderline patients, described the 
spontaneous appearance in his own awareness of what 
he calls a “psychotic counter-transference,” in which he 
comes to understand that his own bizarre involuntary 
imagery and even delusional content normally alien 
to himself, is actually indicative of inner states in his 
patients which are unbearable to them, and so induced 
instead in the empathic therapist. This would be a 
version of Bataille’s “intimacy” of deep subjectivity, 
appearing even within the ostensible emotional isolation 
of schizophrenia.  To the extent Searles could recognize 
the ostensible source of these states and inwardly accept 
them, the patients could gradually begin to report 
these same experiences in themselves, now felt to be 
more tolerable.  W. R. Bion (1962) suggested that such 
acceptance by the therapist allows these projected toxic 
states to be inwardly “de-toxified” and so “returned” to a 
self-aware ownership in the patient.
 Searles (1979) concluded that often as children 
such patients had unconsciously taken on the intolerable 
anxieties of their near-psychotic parents, in part as an 
automatically empathic attempt to make bearable or 
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“cure” the suffering of their loved parents—but doomed 
to fail owing to the depth of the anxieties involved and 
their own immaturity.  One can generalize Searles’ model 
to suggest that children high in creativity and imaginative 
sensitivity are fated to take on the valuative crises of 
their surroundings, initially of their parents and then 
potentially as adults of the valuative dilemas of society 
at large (Hunt, 2000).  In tribal times these would have 
been the children, often following the early death of a 
parent, whose visions and dreams marked them as future 
shamans (Eliade, 1964). Certainly in Bataille’s case we 
see his massively overwhelming identification with the 
slowly dying father and its later attempted alignment 
with a redemptive post-Nietzschean spirituality. 
 The later Bataille intuited his own similar model 
for the societal projection and reciprocal induction of 
mystical-ecstatic experience. He suggests that after 
the greater individual sovereignty of access to ecstatic 
states in shamanic societies was gradually lost, more 
complex social orders “worked” in part through the 
projection of this capacity, still nascent within each 
individual, onto powerful others defined as “sovereign.” 
Meanwhile the latter’s often involuntary enactment of 
this “excess” helped to compensate the average person for 
the inevitable servilities of daily life.  Indeed subsequent 
anthropological research has shown a steady decline in 
socially sanctioned individual access to trance experience 
as social-economic complexity increases (Bourguignon, 
1973).  Bataille goes further to suggest that a projected 
existential sovereignty and nascent ecstasy is then sensed 
indirectly and by proxy through its mirrored reflections, 
back from respected rulers and priests to its actual 
source in the individual. “The possibility that any man 
has of perceiving his own inner truth in others, and the 
difficulty he has in perceiving it in himself, accounts 
for [this] disarming aspect of sovereignty” (Bataille, 
1976/1993, p. 247). Namely, that we unconsciously give 
it away, and gain its pale reflection back from religious 
leaders, kings, and now movie stars.
 For Bion (1965) we cannot know our own Being 
but only be it.  Bataille is adding that we can both know 
it and be it indirectly and partially, as reflected back to 
us by certain significant others.  It is here that Bataille 
also anticipates the understanding of self awareness 
developed by the psychoanalyst Winnicott (1971), 
Lacan, and recent cognitive approaches to mirroring 
(Meltzoff, 2002), in which what the developing infant 
sees in the responsive faces of its caretakers is its own 
emotive reflection, which it then comes to own as its 
personal sense of “self” through its identification with 
them. Human self consciousness is thus based on the 
partial re-owning of one’s own expressive states, as to 
varying degrees they are reflected back to us by others.
 For Bataille, quite apart from the political and 
physical oppression involved, Feudal societies could 
become more “livable” for the average person through 
this embodied reflection of individual sovereignty back 
from God and King, and from the magnificence of 
medieval cathedrals—a sovereignty necessarily sacrificed 
in the daily labor of the peasants.  The latter could come 
to an indirect sense of ecstatic presence by virtue of 
imagining what it might be “like” to be a king, lord, 
or priest, while this would in turn place unconscious 
pressures on those with such “sovereign” status that they 
may or may not have been able to embody without some 
risk of paranoid grandiosity—a phenomenology well 
documented by Canetti in his Crowds and Power (1966).
 By extension, one could add that a 
corresponding danger in “new age” spiritual movements 
can appear when leaders lack the humility to recognize 
their “holding” of their followers own incipient ecstatic 
capacities, and also fail to accept the guidance they 
gain by means of that very projection.  Also, a spiritual 
teacher may not be able to “hold” the more negative 
inflations, despair, and deficiencies that they are also 
asked to contain and de-toxify.  A further consequence 
of the social phenomenology Bataille lays bare occurs 
where more overtly “pathological” gurus (Storr, 1996) 
may not themselves be able to embody and feel what 
their followers actually feel in their presence, as a sort 
of “inversion” of the forms of group “empowerments” 
based on genuine realizations in the teacher.  Given the 
subtlety of such relationships, perhaps we should take 
figures such as Socrates or Jesus more at their word, and 
without either our own or any attributed irony, when 
they appear not to know, must ask others, or for a time 
cannot fully accept, who they are actually becoming. 
The gradual ownership, containment, and constructive 
direction of such “excess” must have been all but over-
powering.5
  Bataille’s understanding of the social external-
ization and reflective identification with one’s own 
capacity for multiple levels of numinous experience 
may be open to further research in the context 
of contemporary transpersonal studies. Although 
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meditation in Buddhist, Sufi, Yogic, and related “new 
age” practices is often solitary, there is also what Bataille 
might understand as the “reciprocal echoing” of the 
widely attested enhancement of meditative experience in 
group settings and retreats. Similarly, there can be the 
subtle guidance that comes from exposure to the outward 
embodiment of realized states in advanced meditators 
and teachers, where what is perceived in these others is 
both the actual outer expression of the realization sought 
and the reflected projection back of its nascent potential 
and beginning within oneself. All  human consciousness, 
at its highest and most debased, and its ostensibly most 
interior forms, is intrinsically social in its form, genesis, 
and potential collectivity (see also Hunt, 2010).
Conclusions
 By the end of the postumously published third 
volume of The Accursed Share, Bataille seems to have 
had a “project” after all, one that he attributes also to 
Nietzsche, as the development of a naturalistically 
understood form of individual mysticism, and one that 
has at least some resonance to later developments in 
transpersonal psychology.  From Nietzsche he derives the 
view that God is a projection of an intrinsically human 
capacity for ecstasy and the sense of sovereign Being, 
and that the task of our radically secularized era is to 
take this actually redeeming and healing capacity back 
as our own. Again, he quotes Nietzsche from his late 
Notebooks:
“One must shatter the all; and [our] baptizing it [as] 
God; take back what we have given to the unknown...
and give it back to what is nearest, what is ours.” 
[Then Bataille:] This sums up the whole movement 
of my thought....I would rediscover in [us] what was 
enchanting in God. (Bataille, 1976/1993, pp. 321, 
459).
It is this tendency for our thoroughly human capacity 
for ecstatic experience to be carried and maintained as 
if from outside that would be called into question in a 
secular mysticism of the future.
 The problem is that this projection of our Being 
that Bataille traces historically may not be accidental or 
somehow optional, but rather intrinsic.  This may follow 
from the permanent incompleteness of the self-referential 
awareness underlying all symbolic intelligence, such that 
it cannot encompass itself from within. This also fits 
with the corresponding ubiquity of a “reflective” physical 
metaphor that runs all through language, as necessary 
for the self depiction of states of consciousness and all 
complex feeling—following here the demonstrations 
of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Asch (1961), and the 
later Jung (1944/1953). We need these outward mirrors 
for the sustaining and representing of even everyday 
emotionality. As social dialogical beings, our fullest 
development of an immanent spiritual capacity may 
correspondingly require its projection and outward 
location, as beyond our phenomenal sense of “ourselves,” 
to be reflected back in the maximally pervasive metaphors 
from nature based on light, open space, and energy.  This 
would be the cognitive medium for ecstatic experience 
(see also Hunt 1984, 1995, 2006).  
 A defining phenomenological characteristic of 
the numinous is the sense that “it has you” not “you 
having it.”  Such experience in its fullest development is 
felt as coming from something beyond.  These experiences 
are dialogically patterned and metaphorically structured. 
Scientifically we may say they are “within,” but 
phenomenologically they come from a larger Beingness 
sensed as beyond/outside the ordinary sense of self, and 
“reflected” back to us via metaphors of encompassing 
light and spaciousness.  
 A related issue that Bataille’s naturalistic 
“immanence” may not be able to resolve is the question of 
what he calls his “atheology.” To what extent, if Heidegger 
and Bataille are correct that the phenomenology 
of human consciousness requires its own reflective 
amplification that will be indistinguishable from the 
general categories of religion and mysticism, must a 
modern naturalism conclude that these forms are drawn 
forward as a kind of cognitive trick or illusion in order 
to fill temporarily the “blindspot” of our intrinsically 
open and uncompletable self awareness? Spirituality, as 
understood from Freud (1930/1961) to Persinger (1987) 
then becomes a sort of “anxiety buffer” for the trap set 
by our uncompletable self aware symbolic capacity. At 
times something like this does seem to be Bataille’s own, 
ultimately nihilistic, conclusion.
 Against that may be two considerations – the 
first immanent, the second perhaps something more. 
With respect to the former, and as developed in more 
detail elsewhere (Hunt, 2000, 2003; Wilber, 2000), there 
is the view of mystical-ecstatic experiences as potential 
markers of an abstract version of “formal operations” 
within emotional/interpersonal intelligence. These 
states do seem to support a genuine decentering from 
an ego-centrism of self image and a radical equilibration 
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of compassionate empathy toward others. Along these 
lines of the functionality of spirituality as a fully mature 
emotional intelligence, one could also call attention to 
the small but convincing literature showing that classical 
forms of mystical experience can be directly curative and 
spontaneously remittive of acute psychotic states (Boisen 
1936/1952; Bowers, 1974), and experimental studies 
showing mystical states to be an accompanent/mediator 
of individual creativity in the arts (Ayers, Beaton, & 
Hunt, 1999; Michalica & Hunt, 2013).
 On the side of “otherness” as necessary mirror 
for transpersonal experience, as the author has developed 
at greater length elsewhere (Hunt, 1995, 2006), the 
metaphors of light, shining darkness, and energy 
embodied in more developed mystical states are drawn 
from the same perceptual matrix that is the source of 
metaphors intrinsic to all forms of human thought – 
humanistic, scientific, and even mathematical (Lakoff & 
Nunez, 2000).  Traditionally, in both classical civilizations 
and in the elaborately metaphoric mythologies of tribal 
peoples, this metaphoricity has allowed the coordination 
of human microcosm and physical macrocosm, creating 
the sense of “unus mundus” that enabled traditional 
peoples to feel “at home” in the universe of their 
understanding.  
 The fascination in both contemporary 
consciousness studies (Atmanspacher & Primas, 2006) 
and transpersonal psychology (Wilber, 1995) with the 
seeming correspondences of the phenomenology of 
consciousness and/or mystical states with aspects of the 
spontaneity and indeterminism of quantum physics, 
and the space/time relativities of physical cosmology, 
may have less to do with mystics somehow directly 
intuiting modern physics (Goswami, 1993), or with 
attempts to use quantum mechanics to explain neuronal 
activity (Hameroff, 2014)—whether the latter be seen 
as promising or itself unintentionally projective (Hunt, 
2001). Rather these parallels would follow from the 
phenomenologies of consciousness and modern physics 
both drawing common metaphors from the same 
background matrix of ambient perception.  The complex 
patterning of perception in motile organisms will itself 
mirror or resonate with the deeper dimensions of physical 
reality by necessity of survival, and especially when 
understood by Gibson (1979) as based on the intricate 
flow gradients that generate the cross species space-times 
of relativistic organismic movement (see Hunt, 1995, 
2006).
 These correspondences, based on the drawing 
out of shared metaphors for both consciousness and 
physical science, will generate their own reciprocal 
mirrors of human microcosm and physical macrocosm. 
These will vary by culture and era, and Miller (2000) 
and Arnheim (1969) have already demonstrated the 
emergent parallels by the 1920s between modern 
abstract art and contemporary physics. To return to 
Bataille on his “excess” as the fundamental form of 
both human and physical realities, if this is not deeply 
resonant with recent formulations of an expansive 
dark energy, universe creating quantum fluctuations in 
nothingness generating the “big bang,” cosmic inflation, 
multi-verses, and infinitely proliferating parallel 
universes, it is not clear what would be.  To dismiss such 
correspondences as a sort of abstract anthropomorphism 
assumes that a) we can ultimately avoid this, if even 
mathematics itself is our own metaphor-based interior 
language, b) that this correspondence was not already 
part of these formulations in physics itself, and c) with 
Heidegger (1942/2013), that we could ultimately know 
what is or is not anthropomorphic anyway, in a universe 
that somehow generated us who also reflect/represent it. 
How with any certainty would we pull out of that circle 
and finally distinguish between ourselves and cosmos if 
our knowledge of both must be ultimately based on the 
same root perceptual metaphors?
 That said, is it somehow “wrong” to respond with 
a sacred sense of awe, wonder, and gratitude, while using 
their respective self-representing physical metaphors, to 
the very existence of that universe?  Are we required to 
stay with Bataille on spirituality as entirely immanent, 
and purely subjective? In his book A Universe from 
Nothing (2012) the physicist Lawrence Krauss claims to 
have demonstrated the final irrelevance of all religious 
and spiritual response to this question of Being itself, 
since the physics of quantum fluctuations within “what 
is essentially nothing” would, on the grounds of physics 
alone, have generated the “big bang.”  He then states that 
physics thereby renders all anthropormorphic spiritual 
categories superceded, making the universe itself the 
“ultimate free lunch” (Krauss, 2012, p. 150). What 
seems utterly strange in this conclusion, especially given 
the “negative theologies” also of such interest to Bataille, 
is how or why the avowedly mundane metaphor of 
“free lunch” for the creative emergence from “nothing,” 
is somehow superior to Eckhart, Ibn Arabi, or the 
later Heidegger on the emergence of Being as a “gift” 
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and “grace”—felt as transcending and encompassing 
humanity, and as occasion for an objective gratitude, 
humility, and wonder.
 If to a surprising degree the great mystics and 
modern physics could be said to “see the same” in these 
ways, it becomes a potentially rather significant matter 
of existential and cultural choice whether we choose 
“free lunch” or “grace”—or even, as Bataille himself 
occasionally verged upon, and perhaps understandably 
given his personal suffering, the sort of “Gnostic curse” 
reflected in his suggestion that the efflugence of time 
and creation out of Eckhart’s Godhead could be taken 
as a manifestation of God’s “self-hatred” (Bataille, 
1954/1988, pp. 102-103). Yet it does seem that some 
form of “anthropomorphic” felt response to our creation 
becomes inevitable—whether explicit in mysticism or 
mostly tacit in physics. We find ourselves intrinsically 
linked to some sense of what is “beyond” and 
“encompassing,” and how we understand that, and the 
extent we can allow our openness to it, becomes crucial 
for how we live.  “Grace” inspires a gratitude, while “free 
lunch” implies a triviality.
 Accordingly, Bataille’s own envisioning of a 
fully developed understanding of ecstasy as an entirely 
interior human capacity may have to fall short of the 
potential he foresaw for a secular spirituality of the 
future, at least to the extent it would also be felt only 
in terms of our own subjectivity and inwardness.  The 
phenomenology of mystical-ecstatic experience seems 
intrinsically pulled beyond that. However humanly 
sovereign and even noble Bataille’s core understanding 
of the numinous as human capacity aspired to be, the 
experiences in question seem to have a broader “truth 
value” than he was able to envision.  Perhaps very much 
with Nietzsche as his major influence, Bataille’s own 
search for a unitive spiritual affirmation had to remain 
more asserted than fully embodied.  Given the burdens he 
carried, what he did manage to achieve and foreshadow 
remains deserving of both respect and empathy, and of 
some further development of what remains novel and 
unassimilated in his later work.
Notes
1. It was the situation of this ecstatic moment as 
exteriorized and dramatized in both the experience 
of the sacrificial victim and of the tribal observers 
identifying with the victim about to be ritually 
slaughtered that led Bataille to his fascination with 
such practices.
2. Bataille also had his own way of extending Weber’s 
(1922/1963) hints of a unique predisposition towards 
a later secularization even in early Christianity, and 
more than in any other world religion. For Weber 
it would seem to be an ethical “on earth as it is in 
heaven” and incarnation of a “son of man” that 
would both blur and endanger the division between 
sacred and profane that Eliade (1959) and Jung 
(1938/1958) saw as central to a directly experiential 
spirituality. Bataille (1957/1986), in turn, expresses 
his own puzzlement over a Christian immortality 
based on the preservation of a “discontinuous” 
personhood, rather than as an amplification of the 
“continuity” and unitive “intimacy” of mystical-
ecstatic experience.  For Bataille the essence of a fully 
felt spirituality would be some final release from 
the endless “project” and demands of a mundane, 
separate individuality.
3. Correspondingly, after the initial flowering of a “new 
age” spirituality through the 1980s, reflecting the 
anticipations of Troeltsch and Bataille, a Weberian 
analysis of more recent economic pressures on the 
once expanded middle classes would predict the 
more reactive, prophetical fundamentalisms of 
recent years, as more communal and with less of the 
individuality central to mysticism. Meanwhile on 
the side of a more populist this-worldly mysticism, 
we find, in addition to continuing “new age” 
tendencies, the more anarchic underground use 
of opiates, barbituates, and methamphetamines as 
ways of catching brief and ultimately self-destructive 
flashes of specific qualities of numinous-uncanny 
states, whose socio-cultural “set and setting” 
unfortunately entail both a context and aftermath 
of anomie and often despair (Hunt, 2003, 2013).
4. Bataille’s discovery of Proust as this-worldly 
mystic is analogous to the realizations of Rank 
(1936/1978), Balint (1932/1965), and Reich (1949) 
that the psychoanalytic experience of “catharsis” 
was not merely a repetition of the past, but in itself a 
potential felt “rebirth,” “new beginning,” or “ecstatic 
release” not part of the original memory, and with 
features of “peak experience” that foreshadowed the 
beginning of a more transpersonal phase of “self-
realization” often unrecognized by more traditional 
psychotherapists.
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5. An irony of the present highly secularized era in 
which children are often not exposed to any formal 
spiritual traditions, and so are lacking any systematic 
exteriorizations of ecstatic capacity into the supra-
sensible, is that they are thereby constrained into their 
own more local “religion of the family.” This very 
modern phenomenon is already embedded in Freud’s 
theory of the “primal horde,” as what is widely seen as 
his own projection of the middle class nuclear family, 
with its oedipal patterning of the punishing father, onto 
his fanciful account of early hominid evolution—then 
to be used in turn as his “explanation” of the Judeo-
Christian God as divine father (Freud, 1939/1961). 
In what I am referring to as the quasi-religion of 
the secular family, and using Bataille’s model of the 
external attribution of one’s own spiritual potential, 
in the absence of any formal, socially endorsed 
transcendent God, the young child will project the 
entirety of its own nascent childlike but numinous 
power, will, and compassion onto the now god-like 
parents, and “worship” in them those same qualities. 
Meanwhile the parents themselves will see their own 
once potential numinous capacity into the actual 
innocence and spontaneity of the child.  The seeds of 
nascent religious experience are thus communally held 
within the family, making the mutual disillusionments 
of adolescence all the worse, and without any more 
overtly mythic externalized mirror and container for 
what are very real energies of the human being.  In the 
case of Bataille, by contrast, more traditional religious 
categories would at least have partly contained the 
suffering of his father as its own crucifixion, while still 
making the extremity of his larger than life status a 
kind of God-man within the family. 
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